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Construal level and free will beliefs
shape perceptions of actors’
proximal and distal intent
Jason E. Plaks* and Jeffrey S. Robinson
Department of Psychology, University of Toronto, Toronto, ON, Canada
Two components of lay observers’ calculus of moral judgment are proximal intent (the
actor’s mind is focused on performing the action) and distal intent (the actor’s mind is
focused on the broader goal). What causes observers to prioritize one form of intent
over the other? The authors observed whether construal level (Studies 1–2) and beliefs
about free will (Studies 3–4) would influence participants’ sensitivity to the actor’s proximal
vs. distal intent. In four studies, participants read scenarios in which the actor’s proximal
and distal intent were independently manipulated. In Study 1, when only distal intent
was present in the actor’s mind, participants rated the psychologically distant actor more
responsible than the psychologically near actor. In Study 2, when only distal intent was
in the actor’s mind, participants with a chronic high level of action identification rated
the actor more responsible than did those with a low level of action identification. In
both studies, when only proximal intent was in the actor’s mind, construal level did not
predict judgments of responsibility. In Study 3, when only proximal intent was present
in the actor’s mind, the more participants believed in free will, the more they rated the
actor responsible. When only distal intent was in the actor’s mind, free will belief did
not influence ratings of responsibility. In Study 4, the same pattern emerged when free
will/determinism beliefs were manipulated and the actor performed a positive (life-saving)
act. The authors discuss how these results shed new light on the literatures on moral
reasoning and psycho-legal theory.
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Introduction
The concept of intentionality holds a central position in both scholars’ and laypeople’s
understanding of moral responsibility (Davidson, 1980; Searle, 1983; Bratman, 1987; Malle and
Knobe, 1997). Numerous studies have demonstrated that people generally hold that there is a
positive relationship between the degree of intentionality of an act and the actor’s degree of moral
responsibility (Pizzaro et al., 2003; Reeder, 2009; Guglielmo and Malle, 2011; Laurin and Plaks,
2014).
Considerably less research, however, has investigated exactly how people calculate the degree
to which an act is “intentional” (for exceptions, see Shaver, 1985; Malle and Knobe, 1997). This
is despite the fact that in many of the thorniest moral and legal dilemmas the actor commits the
act with only partial awareness or control (e.g., Hart and Honore, 1959; Duff, 1990). To begin to
illustrate varieties of ambiguous intent, consider the following:
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J.G. wanted to kill his rich uncle, as he stood to inherit a large
sum of money. He decided to kill his uncle by running him down
with his car. He began to drive speedily to his uncle’s home. As he
drove, he thought about killing his uncle. While approaching his
uncle’s house, J.G. noticed a person crossing into the path of the
car. Startled to see a person in the road, J.G tried to press the brake
but accidentally pressed the accelerator instead. The car struck
the pedestrian, killing the pedestrian instantly. The pedestrian
turned out to be his uncle.
In this scenario (adapted from Chisholm, 1966), the means
and the end have been decoupled; although J.G. desired his
uncle’s death, played a role in causing the death, and was in
fact thinking about killing his uncle at the time of the death,
the death blow occurred outside of J.G.’s control. Philosophers
and psychologists have referred to this type of scenario as
“causally deviant” (e.g., Davidson, 1980; Mitchell, 1982). In
several studies Pizzaro et al. (2003) found that, despite the
presence of identical motives and outcomes, participants rated
actors in causally deviant scenarios less responsible than actors
in scenarios in which the murder proceeded according to
plan. This finding suggested that perceivers do not always
consider intentionality a binary, “either/or” concept. At times,
they are sensitive to gradations of intent and, in turn, moral
responsibility.
Proximal Intent and Distal Intent
Contemporary theories of moral judgment, to the extent that
they include an intentionality component, tend to operationalize
intentionality in explicitly binary terms; i.e., “intentional” or
“unintentional” (e.g., Cushman, 2008; Young and Saxe, 2008;
Malle et al., 2014). While agreeing that lay perceivers often
use a binary distinction between intentional and unintentional
action, Plaks et al. (2009b) proposed that when intentionality
is ambiguous, observers turn to a more incremental model.
The authors posited that the lay concept of intentional action
contains at least two subcomponents: proximal intent and distal
intent. Plaks et al. (2009b) defined proximal intent as the
exercise of awareness and control over the physical performance
of the critical act (i.e., doing in “on purpose”). In other
words, the actor’s mind is focused on the immediate aim of
task execution. Distal intent is defined as the performance
of the act as a means to an end. That is, during the act,
the actor’s mind is focused on a larger aim, beyond the act
itself.
Put differently, proximal intent describes intentionality
with respect to the means, whereas distal intent describes
intentionality with respect to the end. Although philosophers and
legal scholars have made related conceptual distinctions between,
for example, “intention” vs. “intention-in-action” (Searle, 1983),
“prospective” vs. “concurrent” intention (Brand, 1984), “oblique”
vs. “direct” intention (Bentham, 1789/1970), and “bare intention”
vs. “intentional action” (Duff, 1990), to our knowledge there have
been few attempts to operationalize and measure laypeople’s use
of these concepts using the tools of contemporary experimental
psychology.
PI and DI May Vary Independently
For most mundane intentional acts (e.g., picking up a coffee
cup), both proximal intent and distal intent operate in tandem;
through the conscious application of force the actor accomplishes
the goal. However, our central hypothesis is that proximal and
distal intent may vary independently. Thus, at the moment of
the act, the actor may be more focused on one form of intent
than the other. For example, when the actor’s mind is firmly
on accomplishing a larger goal, but the outcome is reached
through coincidence, the act has occurred with distal intent
more prominent than proximal intent. (The “J.G.” scenario
presented above fits into this category). On the other hand, an
act that occurs with the actor focused primarily on the details
of execution—as opposed to the larger goal—has occurred with
proximal intent more prominent than distal intent. For example,
imagine that J.G. (who wants to kill his uncle), while practicing
shooting his gun, focuses intently on his firing technique. While
killing the uncle is not on J.G.’s mind at that exact moment, a
bullet shoots out and happens to hit the uncle. In short, onemight
represent the presence or absence of proximal intent and distal
intent using a 2 (distal intent: present vs. absent) × 2 (proximal
intent: present vs. absent) framework.
We wish to note that although in the present studies we
operationalized distal and proximal intent dichotomously (i.e.,
either present or absent), it is more likely that people mentally
represent the presence/absence of proximal and distal intent as
continua. Thus, it is possible that, for example, when an actor
performs an action with proximal intent present, distal intent is
never completely absent. As such, our labels for the conditions
in the present studies (e.g., Distal Intent Only,” “Proximal Intent
Only”) should be interpreted as shorthand for more cumbersome
labels like “Proximal Intent more prominent in consciousness
than Distal Intent.” Accordingly, we suggest that laypeople’s
judgments of responsibility are sensitive to cases when each form
of intent ismore vs. less present.
Why is it important to distinguish between proximal and
distal forms of intent? Designs that independently manipulate
the presence or absence of both forms of intent may allow
researchers to pinpoint with greater precision how different
psychological variables influence perceptions of intent and, in
turn, responsibility. For example, some variables may attune
perceivers to whether the actor performed the act with awareness
and control (proximal intent) more than whether the actor
performed the act as a means to an end (distal intent). Other
variables may attune participants to distal intent more than to
proximal intent. In Studies 1 and 2 we present evidence that (high
level vs. low level) action construal is associated with greater
emphasis on the actor’s distal intent. In Studies 3 and 4 we present
evidence that higher belief in free will is associated with greater
emphasis on the actor’s proximal intent.
Distinguishing Distal Intent from Related
Concepts
Distal intent differs from the concept of “desire.” Desire refers to
a preference or wish for a particular outcome. People, however,
do not always act on their desires. For example, an individual
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may harbor a sexual desire toward another individual, but never
act on it (e.g., Cohen and Rozin, 2001). An intentional act, in
contrast, goes beyond thought to goal-directed action (Brand,
1984; Malle, 2004). Thus, we operationalize distal intent as not
merely the actor’s desire, but the actor’s representation that the
act currently being performed is aimed toward a specific end. In
the present studies, desire was kept constant by being present in
all conditions (e.g., J.G. wishes his uncle to die). Distal intent,
however, was manipulated by being present in the actor’s mind
in some conditions, but absent in others.
Distal intent also differs from such legal and philosophical
concepts as “motive” or “plan” (Kenny, 1978; Duff, 1990). A
motive refers to aspects of the actor’s station in life that could
plausibly explain why he or she performed the act (e.g., J.G.
stands to inherit money from his uncle). A plan refers to
the actor’s prearranged set of instructions for performing the
act. Distal and proximal intent refer to thoughts in the actor’s
conscious mind the moment the act is taking place. Thus, whereas
motive and plan refer to preexisting thoughts that may be
independent of the act itself, distal intent, by definition, can only
be present when the act is occurring. In the present studies,
participants read scenarios in which the actor’s motive and
plan were kept constant across all conditions, while distal and
proximal intent were manipulated. In Figure 1, we suggest one
possible way to represent the relationships among these various
constructs.
One model that, to our knowledge, has come closest to
focusing on the actor’s in-the-moment thought is Malle and
Knobe model (1997), which identified “awareness of the act while
the person is performing it” as one of five key components of
the folk theory of intentionality. In one study that manipulated
aspects of awareness, the authors presented participants with
a scenario in which an actor learned a technique to cheat
cashiers. The authors manipulated whether the actor “left the
store knowing he received too much change” or “left the store
unaware that he received too much change.” It is not clear
from this manipulation, however, what specifically the actor was
thinking about during the act itself—e.g., the details of executing
the scam, a broader goal to use the ill-gotten money to buy a
new stereo, both, or neither? The present research aims to address
these distinctions.
Another literature that has focused on similar issues is
research on the “side-effect effect” (Knobe, 2003; Laurent et al.,
2015). In addressing the issue of whether the “badness” of an
action’s outcome influences the degree to which the action is
viewed as intentional, researchers have helpfully pointed out that
people distinguish between “intentions” (which are associated
with overarching goals) and “intentionality” (which is associated
with the means to furthering those goals) (Laurent et al., 2015).
In the present studies, we extend this literature by holding the
outcome constant. We suggest that, independently of the severity
of the outcome, lay perceivers generally distinguish between
proximal and distal forms of intent.
Preliminary Evidence
Plaks et al. (2009b) presented participants with scenarios in
which the actor’s proximal and distal intent were independently
manipulated. They found that participants rated the actor with
both forms of intent in mind most responsible, an actor with one
but not the other partially responsible, and an actor with neither
form of intent least responsible. Moreover, Plaks et al. (2009b)
isolated psychological variables that predict whether perceivers’
judgments will be more influenced by the presence or absence of
proximal intent or distal intent. One such variable was whether
participants were primed with a “psychodynamic” or “cognitive
control” model of the human mind. Those who read an article
touting evidence that “people’s desires inevitably get expressed
in behavior, such as ‘Freudian slips”’ were more sensitive to
whether the actor had the malevolent goal in mind (i.e., whether
distal intent was present or absent) than whether the act was
performed on purpose (i.e., whether proximal intent was present
or absent). In other words, from the psychodynamic perspective,
because desires lead inexorably to their corresponding actions,
simply having the malevolent goal in mind is sufficient grounds
for punishment. Those primed with an article touting evidence
that “people are capable of controlling even their deepest wishes
and desires” were more focused on whether proximal intent
was present or absent than whether distal intent was present or
absent. In other words, from the cognitive control perspective,
control over the mechanics of action is the key. Thus, performing
the act with awareness and control is sufficient grounds for
punishment, even if the actor did not believe at the time that he
was committing murder.
Such data provide initial evidence that the Proximal
Intent/Distal Intent framework represents an effective tool
for isolating different observers’ points of emphasis as they
determine an actor’s level of responsibility. In the present
studies, participants read scenarios in which we independently
FIGURE 1 | A model depicting the relationships among proximal intent, distal intent, and other related constructs.
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manipulated whether distal intent or proximal intent was more
prominent in the actor’s mind. In Studies 1 and 2, we examined
one variable that was hypothesized to affect sensitivity to distal
intent: high- vs. low-level construal of action. In Studies 3 and
4, we examined a second variable that was hypothesized to affect
sensitivity to proximal intent: belief in free will.
Why Construal Level and Free Will Beliefs?
We selected these particular variables for two reasons. First,
although both variables have been linked to general increases
or decreases in punitiveness toward a wrongdoer (e.g., construal
level: Eyal et al., 2008; Gong and Medin, 2012; free will beliefs:
Clark et al., 2014; Shariff et al., 2014), neither variable, to
our knowledge, has been applied to the perception of the
actor’s intent. Second, for both variables, the evidence regarding
moral judgment is not entirely clear. For example, whereas
Eyal et al. (2008) found evidence for a link between high-
level construal and higher punishment, Gong and Medin (2012)
subsequently presented evidence for the opposite: a link between
low-level construal and higher punishment. In addition, whereas
several studies have linked higher free will beliefs with higher
punishment (e.g., Clark et al., 2014), others have questioned
the manner in which free will beliefs have been assessed (e.g.,
Nadelhoffer et al., 2014).
We suggest that distinguishing between proximal and distal
intent may help to advance both literatures by highlighting cases
when construal level and free will beliefs do and do not affect
participants’ judgments. To foreshadow the results, in Studies 1–
2 we report evidence that higher construal leads to more extreme
moral judgment only when distal intent is more prominent in
the actor’s mind than proximal intent. In Studies 3–4 we report
evidence that higher belief in free will predicts more extreme
judgment in all cases except when distal intent is more prominent
in the actor’s mind than proximal intent.
Study 1
The same actionmay bementally represented at different levels of
abstraction (e.g., Vallacher andWegner, 1987; Maass et al., 1989).
For example, “following lines of print,” “reading,” and “acquiring
knowledge” might all be used to describe the same act. What
determines whether people will select a higher, more abstract
construal or a lower, more concrete construal?
One answer appears to be psychological distance. Numerous
studies indicate that higher psychological distance elicits higher
level construals (e.g., Bar-Anan et al., 2006; for a review, see
Trope and Liberman, 2010). Psychological distance has been
operationalized in a variety of ways, including physical distance
(e.g., Maglio et al., 2013), temporal distance (e.g., Nussbaum et al.,
2003), and social power (Smith and Trope, 2006). In the present
study, we manipulated the physical distance of the actor from the
Canadian participants: half of the participants were led to believe
that the event occurred in Russia.
We hypothesized that actors judging the distant target would
be more sensitive to the presence or absence of distal intent.
This is because a higher level construal goes beyond the physical
motion to include the actor’s aim or purpose (Kozak et al., 2006).
Thus, we expected that when the actor had the malevolent distal
aim inmind but performed the act by accident, participants in the
distant condition would judge the actor more harshly than would
those in the near condition. Proximity, in contrast, encourages a
more concrete representation that focuses on means, rather than
outcomes (e.g., Liberman and Trope, 1998). Thus, we expected
that when the actor performed the physical act with awareness
and control but did not have the malevolent distal intent in mind,
participants in the near condition would judge the actor more
harshly than would those in the distant condition. Statistically
speaking, the hypothesis was for two main effects (Distal Intent:
present vs. absent; Proximal Intent: present vs. absent) and two
two-way interactions (Distal Intent × Distance; Proximal Intent
× Distance).
Method
Participants
A total of 149 (77 males) undergraduates at the University of
Toronto participated in one session in a lecture setting. (Ethnic
breakdown: 44% White, 29% East Asian, 11% South Asian, all
remaining identities <10%.) Sample size was determined by
the number of students in the class. All participants provided
informed consent. This study and all subsequent studies received
ethics approval from the University of Toronto Research Ethics
Board (Social Sciences, Humanities, and Education REB).
Procedure
Participants were randomly assigned to receive one of eight
booklets of printed materials. In all scenarios, participants were
introduced to “Alex” and “Linda” with accompanying photos. In
all scenarios Alex’s desire (to kill Linda) and plan (to drown her
in a lake) were kept constant while intent was manipulated. In the
Both Present condition, Alex had the distal intent to kill Linda in
mind as he carefully and purposefully executed his plan to tie her
up and drown her in the lake. In the Distal Intent Only condition,
Alex had the distal intent (killing Linda) in mind at the moment
when the outcome occurred in a causally deviant manner (Linda
died while attempting to escape). In the Proximal Intent Only
condition, Alex did not have the intent to kill Linda in mind at
the moment when he purposefully performed the action (pulling
a rope) that ended up killing Linda. In the Both Absent condition,
he had neither the distal intent in mind, nor did he perform the
death blow on purpose (i.e., proximal intent was not in mind).
To summarize, distal intent was manipulated by whether
Alex’s mind at the moment of the death blow was vs. was not
focused on killing Linda. Proximal Intent was manipulated by
whether the death blow occurred under Alex’s control vs. not
under Alex’s control. All other content was held constant. (See
Supplementary Material).
To manipulate distance, half of the participants read that
the event occurred in Russia with characters named Igor and
Svetlana. The same photos were used in both the near and far
conditions. Note that the use of Russian vs. Canadian characters
manipulates not only physical distance, but social distance
(Liviatan et al., 2008). Social distance manipulations have been
found to yield effects parallel to those of other forms of distance,
including physical and temporal distance (Maglio et al., 2013).
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After reading one of the eight scenarios, participants provided
ratings (on 0–6 scales) on four moral judgment items: “How
much moral responsibility does Alex have for what happened
to Linda?,” “How intentional was Alex’s action?,” “How much
blame should go to Alex for what happened to Linda?,” “How
negatively should Alex by judged?” We included a range of
intentionality, blame, and punishment items to assess whether
participants would exhibit any divergences between ascriptions
of intentionality and punishment (e.g., Cushman et al., 2012).
Results and Discussion
Because the moral judgment items were highly correlated
(Cronbach’s α = 0.94), they were combined into a moral
judgment index. Participants’ scores on the moral judgment
index were submitted to a 2 (distance: near vs. far) × 2 (distal
intent: present vs. absent) × 2 (proximal intent: present vs.
absent) between-subjects ANOVA.
Overall Effects
This analysis revealed the predicted main effects for distal intent,
F(1, 141) = 47.80, p < 0.001, and proximal intent, F(1, 141) =
12.51, p = 0.001. Not surprisingly, participants rated the actor
with both forms of intent present (M = 5.69, SD = 0.81)
substantially more responsible than the actor with both absent
(M = 3.67, SD = 1.43), F(1, 141) = 52.12, p < 0.001, d = 1.80.
Participants also rated the actor with only distal intent in mind
(M = 5.07, SD = 1.27) less responsible than the actor with
both present, F(1, 141) = 4.76, p < 0.05, d = 0.59, but more
responsible than the actor with both absent, F(1, 141) = 23.91,
p < 0.001, d = 1.04. Similarly, participants rated the actor
with only proximal intent in mind (M = 4.34, SD = 1.26) less
responsible than the actor with both present, F(1, 141) = 23.13,
p < 0.001, d = 1.30, and more responsible than the actor with
both absent, F(1, 141) = 5.79, p < 0.05, d = 0.50.
Effects Involving Distance
Participants in the near vs. far conditions did not differ in the
overall harshness of their judgment of Alex, F(1, 141) = 1.03, p =
0.31. However, the predicted distal intent x distance interaction,
F(1, 141) = 6.97, p < 0.01, indicated that participants in the two
distance conditions were differentially influenced by the presence
or absence of distal intent. In addition, the predicted proximal
intent x distance interaction, F(1, 141) = 5.82, p < 0.05, suggested
that participants in the two distance conditions were differentially
influenced by the presence or absence of proximal intent.
Investigating the distal intent × distance interaction first,
participants in the far condition rated the actor with distal intent
present (i.e., the mean of the Both Present and Distal Intent Only
conditions) (M = 5.70, SD = 0.74) more responsible than the
actor with distal intent absent (i.e., the mean of the Both Absent
and Proximal Intent Only conditions) (M = 3.87, SD = 1.28),
F(1, 145) = 45.36, p < 0.001, d = 1.81. For near condition
participants, this difference (Mpresent = 5.02 vs. Mabsent = 4.19)
was only of one-third the magnitude F(1, 145) = 28.94, p < 0.001,
d = 0.59. In other words, although everyone judged the target
more responsible when distal intent was present than when it was
absent, this difference was greater for participants who were far
from the actor.
Turning next to the proximal intent × distance interaction,
participants in the near condition rated the actor more
responsible with proximal intent present (i.e., the mean of the
Both Present and Proximal Intent Only conditions) (M = 5.14,
SD = 1.23) than absent (i.e., the mean of the Both Absent
and Distal Intent Only conditions) (M = 4.00, SD = 1.47),
F(1, 145) = 11.75, p < 0.001, d = 0.85. For participants in the
far condition, this difference (Mpresent = 4.91, SD = 1.27 vs.
Mabsent = 4.67, SD = 1.51) was not significant, F(1, 145) = 0.59
p = 0.44. In other words, only near participants judged the target
more responsible when proximal intent was present than when it
was absent.
In a more direct test of our hypotheses, we compared the
two distance groups within each scenario condition. Means
for the moral sanction index are depicted in Table 1. (Means
for each separate moral judgment question are presented in
Supplementary Material).
In the Distal Intent Only condition, simple effects tests
revealed that participants in the far condition (M = 5.68, SD =
0.71) rated the actor more responsible than did those in the near
condition (M = 4.34, SD = 1.43), F(1, 148) = 11.39, p = 0.001,
d = 1.26. In the Proximal Intent Only condition, the effect
trended in the opposite direction (Mnear = 4.67, SD = 1.34 vs.
Mfar = 4.06, SD = 1.14), F(1, 148) = 2.61, p = 0.09, d = 0.49. A
significant 2 (distance: near vs. far)× 2 (scenario: Proximal Intent
Only vs. Distal Intent Only) interaction, F(1, 74) = 12.64, p =
0.001, confirmed that participants in the near vs. far conditions
differed in their view of which single type of intent (proximal vs.
distal) carried more weight.
Note that participants in the near and far conditions rated
the actor equally responsible in the condition that was clearly
“intentional” (Both Present: Mnear = 5.65, SD = 0.87
vs. Mfar = 5.72, SD = 0.78). The same was true in
the condition that was clearly “unintentional” (Both Absent:
Mnear = 3.68, SD = 1.42 vs. Mfar = 3.66, SD = 1.49).
In other words, if intentionality had been operationalized in
a binary fashion, the data might suggest that psychological
distance has no effect on moral judgment. However, with
intentionality operationalized in a 2×2 fashion, it was possible to
TABLE 1 | Study 1.
Distal Intent
Proximal Intent Present Absent
DISTANT CONDITION
Present 5.72 (0.78) 4.06 (1.14)
Absent 5.68 (0.71) 3.66 (1.42)
NEAR CONDITION
Present 5.65 (0.87) 4.67 (1.34)
Absent 4.34 (1.42) 3.68 (1.49)
Moral sanction of the actor (0–6 scale) as a function of psychological distance and
the presence or absence of proximal intent and distal intent. (standard deviations in
parentheses).
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pinpoint a specific case when psychological distance yields a clear
effect.
To summarize, when the actor did not have the malevolent
goal in mind but did produce the death blow on purpose,
participants who were near to the actor assigned more
responsibility than did participants who were far from the actor.
If anything, psychological distance had the reverse effect when
the actor had the malevolent goal in mind but did not produce
the death blow on purpose.We suggest that this occurred because
higher level representations generally include information about
the actor’s broader aim (Vallacher and Wegner, 1987). Lower
level representations focus more on concrete aspects of the
action itself. Thus, broadening observers’ representation of the
action highlights the question of whether the actor had the
malevolent underlying aim in mind as he performed the act. In
contrast, narrowing observers’ representation raises the salience
of intentionality related to the physical application of force: i.e.,
whether the actor performed the physical act with awareness and
control. In Study 2 we examined this idea in a different way, using
an individual differences approach.
Study 2
In Study 2 we made three additional changes. First, rather than
using scenarios in which the actor causes the death of another
person, we used scenarios in which the actor causes a positive
outcome. Do perceivers apply an analogous framework to their
judgments of meritorious acts? How do people understand an
actor who had a meritorious distal intent in mind but achieved
the outcome through serendipity or clumsiness? How do people
understand an actor who performed an act in a controlled that
turned out to be unexpectedly positive? Put differently, are there
asymmetries in the judgment of negative vs. positive actions
(e.g., Wiltermuth et al., 2010) or do differences in the abstract
vs. concrete mental representation of action affect perceptions
of proximal and distal intent equivalently for positive acts and
negative acts?
Second, people make intentionality judgments in mundane
situations that are morally neutral. Do people extend the PIDI
framework to such acts? If so, this would suggest that people
consider the independent input of proximal and distal intent
when evaluating all actions, not just morally-charged actions. If
not, it would suggest that people only apply the PIDI framework
to morally-charged actions. To examine this question, in the
present study the actor did not kill anyone. Instead, she kicked
a soccer ball into a goal.
Third, we examined abstract vs. concrete representation
of behavior via individual differences in Action Identification
(Vallacher and Wegner, 1987). According to this theory, people
may label their own actions (Vallacher and Wegner, 1989) or the
actions of others (e.g., Kozak et al., 2006) at a high level or a low
level. For example, the same act may be represented as “killing
a person” or “pulling a trigger.” Lower level representations
focus primarily on procedural or action details with little
information regarding why the action was made. Higher level
representations include information about “the purpose of the
act, its effects, and the particular situation” (Vallacher and
Wegner, 1989).
Kozak et al. (2006) documented a general association between
higher levels of action identification and higher attributions
of intentionality to an actor (especially when the actor was
likeable). These researchers did not, however, manipulate the
degree to which the actor’s act was intentional. We suggest that
because higher level action representations take into account the
actor’s larger purpose, they should be associated with sensitivity
to the actor’s distal intent. Because lower level representations
are focused more on concrete action details, they should
be associated with sensitivity to proximal intent. Thus, we
hypothesized that observers who chronically tend to make high
level identifications would be more influenced than observers
who tend to make low level identifications by the relative
presence or absence of distal intent in the actor’s mind. In
contrast, we hypothesized that low level observers would be more
influenced than high level observers by the relative presence or
absence of proximal intent.
Numerous studies have indicated that people vary reliably in
how they identify actions (e.g., Vallacher and Wegner, 1989).
To measure individual differences in the tendency to identify
actions as a high or low level, we used the 25-item Behavior
Identification Form (BIF), which possesses strong psychometric
properties (Vallacher and Wegner, 1989).
Method
Participants
A total of 468 (255 females) American participants (mean
age = 36.14, SD = 12.52, minimum = 18, maximum = 76)
participated online via Amazon Mechanical Turk in exchange
for $0.50 compensation. (Ethnic breakdown: 69% White, 3%
Black, 5% Latino, 8% East Asian, 3% South Asian, 1% Middle
Eastern, remainder “other.”) Sample size was determined via
power analyses (with G*Power) using effect sizes reported in
previous studies. All participants provided informed consent.
Procedure
Participants were randomly assigned to read one of four
scenarios. In all scenarios participants read that “Jane’s soccer
team is tied with its arch-rival with 1min left in the championship
game. Jane desperately wants her team to score a goal and win the
championship. Jane has the ball at her feet near the opponent’s
goal.” In the Both Present scenario, Jane aims for the corner of
the goal and with precision and control kicks the ball into the
net. In the Distal Intent Only condition, she aims for the corner
of the goal but the ball veers off course, bounces off a defender,
and goes into the net for a goal. In the Proximal Intent Only
condition, she aims to pass the ball to her teammate, accurately
kicks the ball toward her teammate, but neither the teammate nor
the goalkeeper are expecting the pass, and the ball goes past them
both into the net for a goal. In the Both Absent condition, Jane
aims to pass the ball to her teammate, but the ball veers off course,
bounces off a defender, and goes into the net for a goal. Thus, the
proximal intent manipulation was whether or not Jane kicked the
ball in a controlled, accurate manner toward her target. The distal
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intent manipulation was whether Jane was aiming for the goal or
aiming for her teammate. (For the full text, see Supplementary
Material).
After reading their assigned scenario, participants rated Jane
on 0–6 scales on items used in Study 1 that were re-worded
in terms of a positive outcome: (1) “How intentional was Jane’s
action?” (2) “How responsible was Jane for the goal?” (3) “How
positively should Jane be viewed?” and (4) “How much praise
does Jane deserve?”
Next, in what was described as a second, unrelated study,
participants completed a series of demographic measures and
unrelated questionnaires1, among which was the Behavioral
Identification Form. On the Behavioral Identification Form
(BIF), participants are presented with 25 behaviors. For each
behavior, participants must rate the degree to which each act
presented at a middle level (e.g., “reading”) is best described at a
higher level (“gaining knowledge”) and a lower level (“following
lines of print”). Ratings on all items are summed to create an
overall BIF score, with higher scores indicating a greater tendency
to make high level identifications.
Results and Discussion
Overall Effects
Two participants did not complete any of the moral judgment
items, leaving a total sample of 466. Because the moral judgment
items were highly correlated (Cronbach’s α = 0.71), they were
averaged to form an index. Participants’ scores on the index were
submitted to a regression analysis with Distal Intent, Proximal
Intent, BIF score, the two-way interaction terms, and the three-
way interaction term entered as predictors. All variables were
centered.
As in Study 1, this analysis revealed the predicted main effects
for distal intent, β = 0.59, t(459) = 9.65, p < 0.001, and proximal
intent, β = 0.38, t(459) = 9.41, p < 0.001. There was not
a significant overall effect of BIF score, β = 0.06, p = 0.15,
indicating that high level observers and low level observers did
not differ in their overall allocation of praise to Jane.
Effects Involving BIF Score (Chronic Level of
Action Identification)
The analysis also revealed a marginally significant BIF × distal
intent interaction, β = 0.07, t(459) = 1.70, p = 0.09 and
significant BIF × distal intent × proximal intent interaction,
β = 0.07, t(459) = 1.92, p = 0.05. The BIF x proximal intent
interaction did not reach significance, p = 0.19.
Probing the distal intent × BIF relationship, further analyses
revealed that high level identifiers (BIF score > +1 SD from the
mean) rated the actor with distal intent present more responsible
than the actor with distal intent absent, β = 0.33, t(463) = 5.33,
p < 0.001, whereas for low level identifiers (BIF score < − 1
SD from the mean), this difference though still significant, was
smaller, β = 0.22, t(463) = 3.55, p < 0.001. In other words,
1The remaining questionnaires were: 1. Regulatory Mode Questionnaire
(Kruglanski et al., 2000); 2. A self-esteem measure (Rosenberg, 1965); 3. My
Religious Faith questionnaire (Cohen et al., 2003). These measures were included
to test hypotheses that are not relevant to the present article.
although everyone judged the target more responsible when
distal intent was present than when it was absent, this difference
was, if anything, greater for high level identifiers.
As in Study 1, we sought a more direct test of our hypothesis
by examining the effect of chronic level of action identification
on participants’ judgment within each scenario condition. Means
are presented in Table 2.
Chronic level of action identification did not influence ratings
in the Both Absent, Both Present, or Proximal Intent Only
conditions, all βs < 0.06, ts > 0.40. However, in the Distal
Intent Only condition, the higher the participant’s level of action
identification, the more praise he or she allocated to Jane, β =
0.29, t(115) = 3.21, p = 0.002. Thus, when the actor’s goal
(kicking the ball into the goal) was in her mind, but the outcome
occurred by accident (it flew wildly off a defender but into the
goal), participants who generally view acts at a higher level gave
the actor more credit than did those who generally view acts at
a lower level. This difference replicates a similar comparison in
Study 1.
We did not, however, replicate Study 1’s finding for the
Proximal Intent Only condition (lower level construers assign
more responsibility than higher level construers). This may
be for a number of reasons. The two studies differed in (a)
how distance/abstraction was operationalized, (b) the valence of
the event (negative vs. positive), (c) the moral significance of
the event (highly charged vs. mundane). Future studies should
systematically vary each of these variables individually to isolate
the cause for the non-replication. An additional possibility is
that psychological distance and action identification generally
influence perceptions of distal intent more than they influence
perceptions of proximal intent. This would be consistent with
previous findings involving temporal distance (Plaks et al., 2009b,
Study 2).
To summarize, the results of Study 2 suggest three
conclusions. First, distal intent generally appears to be
represented at a higher level than proximal intent. This fits
with the definition of high level identification as sensitive to the
act’s larger purpose. Second, observers who chronically viewed
acts at a high level were more impressed by the presence or
absence of distal intent than were observers who chronically
TABLE 2 | Study 2.
Distal Intent
Proximal Intent Present Absent
HIGH LEVEL ACTION IDENTIFIERS
Present 5.18 (0.56) 4.04 (0.15)
Absent 3.96 (0.49) 3.62 (0.07)
LOW LEVEL ACTION IDENTIFIERS
Present 4.92 (0.14) 3.95 (0.09)
Absent 3.57 (0.54) 3.55 (0.02)
Moral praise of the actor (0–6 scale) as a function of chronic action identification and the
presence or absence of proximal intent and distal intent. Values represent point estimates
from the regression. “High” and “Low” Level Action Identifiers represent greater than +1
and less than −1 standard deviation from mean of the BIF scale. Standard deviations are
in parentheses.
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viewed acts at a low level. Third, it appears that people do not
only apply proximal and distal intent to understand negative
or morally-relevant acts; Study 2 participants applied a similar
analysis when assessing the intentionality of actions that were
positive and did not possess obvious moral implications.
Study 3
In Studies 3 and 4 we turned to the question of how observers’
beliefs might influence the weight they place on proximal and
distal intent. This approach builds on the existing literature
on the role of a priori beliefs, or “implicit theories,” in moral
cognition (Miller et al., 2007) and social cognitionmore generally
(e.g., Molden et al., 2006; Plaks et al., 2012; for a review see, Plaks
et al., 2009a).
One logical place to start is with beliefs regarding free
will/determinism. The assumption that people possess a large
degree of freedom over their thought and action lies at the heart
of most legal systems (Hart and Honore, 1959; Duff, 1990), which
generally hold that it is only fair to punish a wrongdoer if he or
she could have done otherwise. Indeed, recent evidence points
to a tight (and bi-directional) relationship in laypeople’s minds
between belief in free will and punitiveness (Clark et al., 2014;
Shariff et al., 2014).
The assumption of free will appears to resonate with popular
views; according to one multinational survey 70% of respondents
believed that their fate is in their own hands (Jowell et al., 1998).
Yet 70% is far from unanimous; studies that have measured belief
in free will using self-report measures have found a fair amount of
variability (Vohs and Schooler, 2008; Paulhus and Carey, 2011).
Moreover, it is not always clear what laypeople mean by “free
will”: Does it refer primarily to freedom to choose one’s actions,
freedom to execute one’s actions, or both?
In Study 3, the primary predictor variable was individual
difference variation in belief in free will. How might belief in
free will relate to sensitivity to proximal or distal intent? One
possibility is that greater belief in free will lead people to focus
more on the actor’s ultimate aim (distal intent). According to this
perspective, because people are capable of selecting their course
of action, the presence or absence of malevolent (or benevolent)
distal intent is of primary importance in moral judgment.
Thus, Hypothesis #1 was that greater belief in free will would
lead to greater sensitivity to the presence or absence of distal
intent.
An alternative possibility is that people generally understand
free will not in terms of selecting one’s course of action, but in
terms of the exercise of control over execution of the action.
According to this perspective, a given desire (e.g., a sexual desire)
may enter one’s head from ambient stimuli in the environment
(e.g., an attractive person walking by), but people have the power
to control, re-channel, or prevent the corresponding action (e.g.,
a sexual advance). This perspective locates free will primarily
in terms of self-control—i.e., liberating action from the clutches
of desire. This emphasis on action control suggests a greater
emphasis on proximal intent. Thus, Hypothesis #2 was that
greater belief in free will would lead to greater sensitivity to the
presence or absence of proximal intent.
The design of the experiment allowed us to test the full
complement of hypotheses. Hypothesis #3 was that greater belief
in free will would lead to greater sensitivity to both proximal and
distal intent. Hypothesis #4 was the null hypothesis (i.e., belief in
free will would have no effect). To test which of these hypotheses
was most consistent with the data, we measured belief in free
will as an individual difference variable and presented scenarios
that manipulated the presence or absence of proximal and distal
intent.
Method
Participants
A total of 165 undergraduates at a Canadian university (73%
female, mean age= 20.47, SD = 2.79) participated in one session
as part of a lecture class. (Ethnic breakdown: 23% East Asian, 16%
White, 12% South Asian, all remaining ethnicities<3%). Sample
size was determined by the number of students in the class. All
participants provided informed consent.
Procedure
Participants were randomly assigned to read one of four booklets
of materials. We adapted scenarios presented by Pizzaro et al.
(2003). In the Both Present condition, an actor (“Barbara”)
had the goal of killing her husband (“John”) in mind as she
successfully executed her plan to poison him during dinner at a
restaurant. In the Distal Intent Only condition, Barbara had the
goal (killing John) in mind at the moment when the outcome
occurred in a causally deviant manner (John died not because
of the poison but because of an allergy to another dish). In
the Proximal Intent Only condition, she did not have the goal
of killing John in mind at the moment when she purposefully
performed the action (pouring the poison) that killed John. In
the Both Absent condition, she had neither the goal in mind,
nor performed the death blow on purpose. In other words,
the proximal intent manipulation was whether the death blow
was performed under Barbara’s control vs. outside of Barbara’s
control. The distal intent manipulation was whether Barbara’s
thoughts at the critical moment were on killing John vs. a
different topic. For the complete scenarios, see Supplementary
Material.
After reading the scenario, participants indicated their rating
(on 0–6 scales) of the actor on the moral judgment items
used in Study 1. In addition, we included new items intended
to assess further aspects of moral judgment. These included
items assessing punishment (“To what extent should Barbara be
punished for her action?”), justice (“To what extent does Barbara
now have ‘bad karma’ as a result of what occurred?” “To what
extent is Barbara likely to get the punishment she deserves?”),
wrongness (“To what extent was what Barbara did fundamentally
wrong?”), the actor’s view of the outcome (“How pleased is
Barbara about what happened?”), and the actor’s moral character
(“To what extent is Barbara a bad person?”).
Finally, participants completed a series of questionnaires
that were unrelated to the present study2. Embedded within
2These measures were: demographics (age, gender, ethnicity); political orientation
(one item); Regulatory Mode (Kruglanski et al., 2000); and Need for Closure
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those measures was a validated measure of belief in free
will/determinism (FAD; Paulhus and Carey, 2011). This measure
contains subscales that distinguish among belief in free will, belief
in two types of determinism (scientific, fatalistic), and belief
in randomness/unpredictability. The free will subscale contains
items such as “People have complete free will” (α = 0.62). The
scientific determinism scale contains items such as “Psychologists
and psychiatrists will eventually figure out all of human behavior”
(α = 0.58). The fatalistic determinism scale contains items such
as “I believe the future has already been determined by fate”
(α = 0.77). The unpredictability scale contains items such as,
“People’s futures cannot be predicted (α = 0.66).” Participants
indicated their level of agreement with these items on 1–5 scales
(1= strongly disagree. . . 5= strongly agree).
Results and Discussion
Overall Effects
Two participants did not complete the moral judgment items,
five did not complete the free will/determinism measure,
and three completed neither, leaving a total sample of 155.
Because all moral judgment items were highly correlated
(Cronbach’s α = 0.82), we combined them into a moral
judgment index. We conducted regression analyses for each of
the free will/determinism questionnaire subscales with Distal
Intent, Proximal Intent, free will/determinism score, all two-way
interaction terms, and the three-way interaction term entered as
predictors. All variables were centered.
Replicating the previous studies, the omnibus analysis
revealed main effects for distal intent, β = 0.20, t(148) = 3.41,
p < 0.001, and proximal intent, β = 0.37, t(148) = 6.56,
p < 0.001. This analysis also indicated a significant main effect
for free will beliefs, β = 0.18, t(148) = 3.12, p < 0.01, replicating
previous demonstrations of an association between free will belief
and harsher punishment (Clark et al., 2014; Shariff et al., 2014).
Effects Involving Belief in Free Will
The analysis also revealed a near significant free will belief ×
proximal intent interaction, β = 0.11, t(148) = 1.93, p = 0.056.
For the test of the free will belief × distal intent interaction, the
values were: β = −0.87, t(148) = −1.53, p = 0.14.
We probed the relationship between belief in free will and
sensitivity to proximal intent with further analyses. High free
will believers (FAD score > +1 SD from the mean) rated the
actor with proximal intent present more responsible than the
actor with proximal intent absent, β = 0.55, t(152) = 5.83,
p < 0.001. For low free will believers (FAD score < −1 SD from
the mean) this difference was significantly smaller, β = 0.16,
t(152) = 1.73, p = 0.09. In other words, high believers in
free will were more sensitive than low believers to the presence
or absence of proximal intent. Analogous analyses revealed that
high and low free will believers did not differ significantly in their
sensitivity to the presence or absence of distal intent, ps> 0.10.
As in the previous studies, the most direct test of our
hypotheses was to examine the effect of the predictor variable
(Webster and Kruglanski, 1994). These measures were included to test hypotheses
that are not relevant to the present article.
within each scenario condition. In the Distal Intent Only
condition, participants’ judgments were not influenced by free
will beliefs, β = −0.09, t(47) = −0.64, p = 0.53. However, in
the Proximal Intent Only condition, the higher the participant’s
free will belief, the more condemnation he or she assigned to the
actor, β = 0.52, t(34) = 3.48, p = 0.001
3. Means are presented
in Table 3.
In other words, when the outcome occurred through a
conscious application of force, participants who generally
believed in free will were more punitive—even if the actor’s
ulterior goal was not in her mind. In addition, higher free
will beliefs predicted higher condemnation in the both present
condition, β = 0.55, p < 0.001 and the both absent condition,
β = 0.32, p = 0.05. This is consistent with the documented
association between free will beliefs and greater punishment
(Shariff et al., 2014. Clark et al., 2014 demonstrate the reverse
causal direction: greater motivation to punish precipitates greater
belief in free will). A boundary condition to this rule appears to be
when the actor has distal intent in mind but not proximal intent.
In that case, free will beliefs no longer predicted punitiveness.
Overall, this pattern is most consistent with Hypothesis #2.
What explains this pattern? These data suggest that laypeople
spontaneously tend to define free will in terms of control over
behavior (as opposed to control over thought). That is, while
people may acknowledge that immoral thoughts often enter
the mind outside of one’s control, they believe that individuals
have the power to control whether these thoughts become
expressed in action. Thus, a higher belief in this form of free will
implies a higher belief that the actor could have acted otherwise.
Philosophers, psychologists, and legal scholars have held that
such a belief in the plausibility of the counterfactual is necessary
for judgments of moral responsibility (e.g., Duff, 1990; Zeki and
Goodenough, 2004).
TABLE 3 | Study 3.
Distal Intent
Proximal Intent Present Absent
HIGH FREE WILL BELIEVERS
Present 5.45 (0.31) 3.86 (0.55)
Absent 3.19 (1.12) 4.13 (0.87)
LOW FREE WILL BELIEVERS
Present 5.02 (0.66) 3.25 (0.54)
Absent 3.26 (0.76) 3.82 (0.74)
Moral sanction of the actor (0–6 scale) as a function of free will beliefs and the presence
or absence of proximal intent and distal intent. Values represent point estimates from
the regression. “High” vs. “Low “Free Will Believers represent greater than +1 and less
than −1 standard deviation from the mean on the FWD scale. Standard deviations are in
parentheses.
3We also conducted analyses using the original four-item moral judgment index
used in the previous studies. The results were equivalent those with the eleven-
item measure. For example, the values for the proximal intent x free will beliefs
interaction were: β = 0.13, t(148) = 2.19, p = 0.03. Within the Proximal Intent
Only condition, higher free will belief predicted harsher judgment: β = 0.45,
t(35) = 2.94, p = 0.006. The correlation between the four-item index and the
eleven-item index was r = 0.93.
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These data parallel previous data in which the experimenters
primed a “cognitive control” lay theory (Plaks et al., 2009b, Study
3). In that study, participants who read a passage indicating that
people have the power to control their actions were similarly
more sensitive to the presence or absence of proximal intent than
they were to the presence or absence distal intent.
Belief in Scientific Determinism
We conducted analogous regression analyses with Distal Intent,
Proximal Intent, scientific determinism score, all two-way
interaction terms, and the three-way interaction term entered as
predictors. All variables were centered. This analysis revealed the
usual main effects of distal intent and proximal intent, both β s>
0.24, both ps< 0.001, but no significant effects involving belief in
scientific determinism, all β s< 0.07, all ps> 0.22.
Belief in Fatalistic Determinism
We conducted analogous regression analyses with Distal Intent,
Proximal Intent, fatalistic determinism score, all two-way
interaction terms, and the three-way interaction term entered as
predictors. This analysis revealed main effects of distal intent and
proximal intent, both βs > 0.25, both ps < 0.001, and a main
effect of fatalistic determinism, β = 0.11, p < 0.05 (indicating
that higher fatalistic determinism generally predicted harsher
condemnation). However, neither the fatalistic determinism ×
distal intent interaction (β = −0.03, p = 0.56) nor the fatalistic
determinism × proximal intent interaction (β = −0.27, p =
0.63) approached significance. Thus, sensitivity to proximal or
distal intent did not vary as a function of belief in fatalistic
determinism.
Belief in Unpredictability
We conducted analogous regression analyses with Distal Intent,
Proximal Intent, unpredictability belief score, all two-way
interaction terms, and the three-way interaction term entered
as predictors. This analysis again revealed main effects of
distal intent and proximal intent, both βs > 0.24, both ps <
0.001, and a main effect of unpredictability belief, β = 0.13,
p < 0.05. However, neither the unpredictability belief x
distal intent interaction (β = −0.08, p = 0.12) nor the
unpredictability belief× proximal intent interaction (β = −0.27,
p = 0.63) were significant. Thus, sensitivity to proximal or
distal intent did not appear to vary as a function of belief in
randomness.
To summarize, we found that free will beliefs influenced
sensitivity to proximal intent, but not distal intent. Belief
in determinism (either type) and belief in randomness did
not influence sensitivity to proximal intent or distal intent.
Future studies should investigate the relationship between free
will beliefs and sensitivity to proximal intent by uncovering
mediating mechanisms. For example, is the effect mediated by
the tendency to deploy the simulation heuristic (Kahneman
and Tversky, 1982)? That is, does belief in free will lead to
punishment for intentionally-performed acts because high free
will believers are more readily able to imagine a counterfactual
outcome in which the actor refrained from performing the
act?
A Caveat
In this study participants completed the measure of free
will beliefs after they had completed the critical independent
and dependent variables. It is important to note that Clark
et al. (2014) found that the desire to punish leads to greater
endorsement of free will. Thus, it is plausible that participants’
free will beliefs were driven after the fact by their reactions to
the target. As such, one purpose of Study 4 was to examine
whether the pattern would replicate when the free will belief
independent variable preceded the moral judgment dependent
variables. In addition, in Study 4 we turned again to the
question of positive acts. Do free will beliefs influence perceptions
of intent in prosocial acts just as they do for antisocial
acts?
Study 4
As noted, the literature on moral judgment has occasionally
found positive/negative asymmetries; people often condemn
immoral acts more extremely than they praise prosocial acts
(e.g., Janoff-Bulman et al., 2009; Wiltermuth et al., 2010).
Presumably this is because the presence of harm is perceived
to be more harmful than the absence of benefits (Janoff-
Bulman et al., 2009). Moreover, such findings are consistent
with general loss aversion tendencies in human judgment and
decision making (e.g., Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Baumeister
et al., 2001). Thus, there are grounds to believe that people
might use the PIDI framework differently for positive vs. negative
acts.
On the other hand, recall that the results across Studies 1–
2 suggested that participants use proximal and distal intent
similarly across blame judgments and praise judgments. Thus,
we hypothesized that the pattern for praise judgments (Study 4)
would parallel those of blame judgments (Study 3). Specifically,
belief in free will would predict higher praise for the actor when
the actor had proximal intent but not distal intent.
A second aim of Study 4 was to manipulate beliefs regarding
free will/determinism. We reasoned that although there are
reliable individual differences in belief in free will, both the
free will position and the determinist position are intuitive to
most people. Thus, compelling messages espousing either belief
may override individuals’ chronic belief. If the results with
manipulated beliefs resembled the results with chronic beliefs,
this would provide evidence that such beliefs play a causal role
in shifting perceivers’ emphasis toward proximal intent or distal
intent.
Method
Participants
A total of 388 U.S. residents (70% female, mean age = 31.76,
SD = 11.60, minimum = 18, maximum = 75) participated
online via Amazon Mechanical Turk in exchange for $0.50.
(Ethnic breakdown: 45% White, 19% East Asian, 14% South
Asian, 3% Black, all remaining ethnicities<2%.) Sample size was
determined with the effect sizes of Study 2 as a reference point.
All participants provided informed consent.
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Procedure
To manipulate beliefs in free will vs. determinism, we used a
procedure reported by Baumeister et al. (2009). The task was
described as a “reading comprehension task.” Participants in
the free will condition read a series of 15 statements (one per
page, self-paced) that supported the idea of free will (e.g., “I
have free will to control my actions and, ultimately, to control
my destiny in life.”). Participants in the determinism condition
read sentences supporting the idea of determinism (e.g., “Our
actions are determined by what we have experienced in the
past combined with the specific genetic predispositions that we
have.”). After each sentence, the computer provided a text box
into which participants were asked to type in the sentence they
had just read. (This helped to bolster the cover story that the study
was about short-term memory. It also served as an attention
check).
Next, participants read one of four positive versions of the
scenarios used in Study 1. In these scenarios, Alex does not wish
to kill Linda. Instead, he wishes to save Linda’s life. Distal Intent
was varied by having Alex’s thought be focused on the goal of
saving Linda vs. the action of pulling a rope. Proximal Intent was
varied by having Alex intentionally pull the rope to release Linda
vs. accidently trip over the rope, causing it to release Linda. (See
Supplementary Material).
Participants completed dependent measures that were
analogous to those used in Study 1. Where appropriate, these
items were reworded in terms of praise/positivity: (1) To what
extent were Alex’s actions intentional? (2) How much moral
responsibility does Alex deserve for what happened? (3) How
positively should Alex be judged? 4. How much praise should
Alex receive as a result of his actions? (0–5 scales).
Results and Discussion
Overall Effects
Because the dependent measure items were highly correlated
(Cronbach’s α = 0.68), they were combined into a positive
judgment index. Participants’ scores on the index were submitted
to a 2 (Distal Intent: present vs. absent) × 2 (Proximal Intent:
present vs. absent) × 2 (belief manipulation: free will condition
vs. determinism condition) ANOVA. Replicating the previous
studies, this analysis revealed main effects for distal intent,
F(1, 380) = 179.95, p < 0.001, and for proximal intent, F(1, 380) =
105.98, p < 0.001. The analysis also revealed a significant main
effect for the belief manipulation, F(1, 380) = 31.62, p < 0.001,
indicating that those in the free will condition generally judged
the actor more favorably than did those in the determinism
condition.
Effects Involving Manipulated Free
Will/Determinism Beliefs
This analysis also revealed a belief manipulation × proximal
intent interaction, F(1, 380) = 6.29, p = 0.01. Neither the belief
manipulation× distal intent interaction, F(1, 380) = 0.01, nor the
three-way interaction, F(1, 380) = 0.42, were significant.
As in the previous studies, we attempted to pinpoint
the effect of free will/determinist beliefs by testing
within each scenario condition. Means are depicted in
Table 4.
In the Proximal Intent Only condition, simple effects tests
revealed that participants in the free will condition (M = 2.42,
SD = 1.04) rated the actor more responsible than did those in the
determinist condition (M = 1.60, SD = 0.78), F(1, 380) = 19.82,
p < 0.001, d = 0.90. In the Distal Intent Only condition, this
difference was significantly reduced, F(1, 380) = 3.36, p = 0.07,
d = 0.34.
Simple effects tests also revealed that free will believers and
determinists did not differ in the condition when both forms of
intent were absent, F(1, 380) = 1.72, p = 0.19, but did differ when
both forms of intent were present, F(1, 380) = 13.02, p < 0.001,
d = 0.83.
In summary, the Study 4 data are consistent with Study
3 in that free will beliefs increased sensitivity specifically to
proximal intent, not distal intent. This pattern held whether
beliefs were measured (Study 3) or manipulated (Study 4). In
addition, whereas previous research has associated belief in
free will with higher punitiveness (e.g., Shariff et al., 2014),
the present study suggests that this effect extends to praise for
meritorious acts. Such a finding is consistent with recent results
reported by Mackenzie et al. (2014) in which higher belief in free
will predicted higher gratitude for a favor. Moreover, although
the moral judgment literature has uncovered positive/negative
asymmetries, in the present studies participants applied the PIDI
framework equivalently to antisocial and prosocial acts. This
suggests that people use the concepts of proximal and distal
intent to calculate intentionality in general, not just for morally
negative acts.
General Discussion
Most people assume that every action is preceded by an
intention to act. Although there is considerable evidence
that this assumption is flawed (e.g., Libet, 1985; Wegner
et al., 2003), it remains a driving force in how both formal
legal systems and laypeople reason about moral responsibility.
But what exactly do people mean by “intention”? In the
present studies, we (a) identified two important aspects
laypeople’s construal of intention and (b) identified two
TABLE 4 | Study 4.
Distal Intent
Proximal Intent Present Absent
FREE WILL CONDITION
Present 3.74 (0.87) 2.42 (1.04)
Absent 2.46 (1.00) 1.35 (0.93)
DETERMINIST CONDITION
Present 3.07 (0.76) 1.60 (0.78)
Absent 2.13 (0.97) 1.11 (0.79)
Moral praise of the actor (0–5 scale) as a function of free will/determinist belief condition
and the presence or absence of proximal intent and distal intent. (standard deviations in
parentheses).
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variables that predict preferential emphasis of one of those
aspects.
In Study 1, when the actor had the malevolent goal in mind at
the time of the act (even if he performed the act by accident),
participants judged the distant actor more harshly than they
judged the near actor. However, when the actor performed the
act on purpose (even if he was not thinking about his malevolent
goal), participants judged the near actor more harshly than
they judged the distant actor. In Study 2, when the actor had
the positive goal in mind at the time of the act (even if the
he performed the act by accident), participants with a chronic
tendency to identify actions at a high level judged the actor more
favorably than those with a tendency to identify actions at a low
level. In Study 3, when the actor did not have the malevolent goal
inmind but did cause the death with awareness and control, those
with a higher belief in free will rated the actor more responsible
than did those with a lower belief in free will. In Study 4, a
similar pattern was found when the actor performed a positive
(life-saving) act and when free will/determinism beliefs were
manipulated, rather than measured.
Thus, two well-studied, conceptually unrelated, social-
psychological variables differentially predicted participants’
sensitivity to proximal and distal intent. Taken together, these
data suggest that the PIDI framework represents a useful way
to organize observers’ subtle but important shades of emphasis
as they determine an actor’s degree of intentionality and moral
responsibility. It accounts for more variability than a binary
distinction between “intentional” vs. “unintentional.” Consider,
for example, that in Studies 1–2, construal level did not predict
differential judgment in the clearly “intentional” condition (Both
Present) or the clearly “unintentional” condition (Both Absent).
However, construal level did predict more extreme judgment in
one case of ambiguous intentionality (Distal Intent Only). In
Studies 3–4, higher belief in free will predicted more extreme
judgment in all conditions except Distal Intent Only. Thus,
the PIDI framework allows researchers to specify with greater
precision how a range of important psychological variables,
including free will beliefs, psychological distance, and culture
(see Plaks et al., manuscript under review) exert their effects on
judgments of responsibility.
We wish to be clear, however, that we do not consider
proximal and distal intent to be the sum total of ingredients of
an intentional act. Indeed, numerous studies have focused on
such elements as the actor’s belief that their action will cause the
outcome (e.g., Young et al., 2007), desire to cause the outcome
(Cushman, 2008), skill to cause the outcome (Guglielmo and
Malle, 2011), and foreseeability of consequences (Searle, 1983;
Duff, 1990). The present studies build on such work by focusing
specifically on two elements of intentionality that guide an action
while it is occurring.
We view distal intent as a mechanism for translating a desire
or plan into a specific act. When the actor has distal intent in
mind while performing the act, she is mentally representing the
specific end her act is addressing (i.e., “keeping her eye on the
prize”). However, keeping one’s eye on the prize is separable
from focusing on the specific muscle movements necessary to
perform the act. For example, during many complex actions
(e.g., kicking a soccer ball into the goal), people may become
temporarily so focused on “the prize” that attention to the specific
motor action recedes. This corresponds to our Distal Intent
Only condition. Similarly, during many complex actions, people
may become temporarily so focused on the mechanics of task
execution that they become “lost in the details.” At that moment,
proximal intent may assume prominence over distal intent. This
corresponds to our Proximal Intent Only condition.
A number of philosophers have found it useful to distinguish
between these two aspects of intent (e.g., Goldman, 1970; Searle,
1983; Brand, 1984; Duff, 1990). The present work suggests
that laypeople also make this distinction. These studies go on
to highlight systematic intra- and inter-individual variation in
points of emphasis within the generic model. Taken together,
these data suggest that (a) the concepts of proximal and distal
intent are intuitive to most people and (b) certain beliefs or foci
will systematically elevate the prominence of one form of intent
over the other.
Implications for Moral Judgment
Prominent contemporary theories of moral judgment (e.g.,
Haidt, 2001; Greene, 2013) have focused on important questions
regarding the role of emotion and reason in people’s deontic vs.
consequentialist tendencies. Perhaps because of the success of
these approaches, considerably less research has focused on the
role of intentionality in moral judgment. But there is much a
focus on intentionality might add (see Gray et al., 2012; Malle
et al., 2014). Consider that in typical scenarios presented to
participants (e.g., the Trolley Problem), the focal act is committed
with both proximal and distal intent present. What would
happen, however, if we expanded the scenario to a full 2 × 2, PI
× DI design? How might people’s moral judgments differ if the
actor pulled lever with only partial intentionally?
In a related vein, much of the literature in moral
judgment has focused on the distinction between rational
and intuitive/affective processes. Thus far, our approach has
been silent regarding whether perceiving one type of intent relies
more on rational, intuitive, or emotional processes. However, in
future studies, one might, for example, introduce a cognitive load
manipulation to the design to test whether any of the processes
documented here are impaired. We suggest, however, that there
is value to identifying the content of people’s moral thought
separately from modes of processing that in and of themselves
possess no moral content. Doing so may allow researchers to
identify important building blocks of moral thought that may,
in turn, be used in different ways depending on whether the
observer is using a more rational or more intuitive/affective
mode of processing. (For similar ideas, see Malle et al., 2014).
Implications for Legal Reasoning
The legal definition of many criminal offenses, including murder
and rape, includes not only the act and its consequences (actus
reus) but the concomitant thoughts, beliefs, and intentions of the
actor (mens rea). Given that jury members are laypeople, there is
a clear benefit to greater understanding of how laypeople reach
their judgments of intent. The present studies identify beliefs and
mindsets that orient people toward the ends or the means. Thus,
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a prosecuting attorney who wishes to have a jury focus on the
actor’s evil intent may do well to use language referring to the
actor’s thoughts, while the defense attorney may strategically use
language that focuses on the action itself. Thus, it may be helpful
for judges’ instructions to alert jurors to such tactics.
Moreover, some theorists have argued that North American
legal codes contain a bias toward “premeditation” (compared
to judging the act itself) (e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1111, 1999, cited in
Malle and Nelson, 2003). Indeed, recent evidence suggests that
North Americans place greater weight on distal intent than do
East Asians and South Asians (Plaks et al., manuscript under
review). Actions differ, however, in their degree of premeditation.
Thus, North American legal codes may not be well-suited to
handle cases of causal deviance, i.e., when the link between distal
intent and proximal intent is disrupted (Denno, 2003; Malle
and Nelson, 2003). For this reason, a fuller understanding of
the components of intentional action may ultimately inform
the writing of legal codes so that they reflect a broader palette
of philosophical and folk-psychological concepts related to
intentional action.
It is also important to note that the relationship in
people’s minds between responsibility and punishment is not
a straightforward one (e.g., Cushman, 2008). People often
mete out harsh punishments for largely unintentional acts
(as in the case of “strict liability” crimes, such as statutory
rape) and punish less harshly for some clearly intentional
acts (e.g., killing in self-defense). The translation from moral
responsibility to punishment is most likely influenced by a range
of additional factors, including lay theories regarding the purpose
of punishment (Carlsmith et al., 2002; Molden andDweck, 2008).
Future Directions
Recently, researchers have suggested that intentionality
calculations feature more prominently in observers’ minds
for some types of transgressions than for others (Young and
Tsoi, 2013). For example, observers appear more inclined to
emphasize outcomes over intentions for purity violations than
for other types of violations (Young and Saxe, 2011). In future
studies, researchers should investigate whether the PIDI model
might, in fact, be less applicable when observers view the act as a
purity violation rather than a fairness violation.
It is clear that proximal and distal intent are only two of
numerous concepts related to the relationship between intent
and moral responsibility. These include such legal concepts as
“negligence,” “recklessness,” and “foreseeable consequences” and
such psychological concepts as “blame” (Malle et al., 2014) and
“culpable causation” (Alicke, 1992). In ongoing research, we
are examining the relationships between proximal and distal
intent and other components of intentional action in order
to develop a more comprehensive model of lay theories of
intentionality.
The Proximal Intent/Distal Intent framework is generative
in that it implies numerous hypotheses for further research.
For example, in an era of high profile, corporate financial
malfeasance, how (if at all) does the pattern found in the
present studies vary for white collar crimes? How (if at all)
does the pattern vary for sins of omission compared to sins of
commission? Do people show differential emphasis on proximal
vs. distal intent when either the actor or the victim is a racial
ingroup vs. outgroup member? Are the answers to any of these
questions subject to cultural variation? These are topics of current
research in our laboratory.
Supplementary Material
The Supplementary Material for this article can be found
online at: http://journal.frontiersin.org/article/10.3389/fpsyg.
2015.00777/abstract
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